Seeking and avoiding choice closure to enhance outcome satisfaction by Gu, Y et al.
LBS Research Online
Y Gu and S Botti and D Faro
Seeking and avoiding choice closure to enhance outcome satisfaction
Article
This version is available in the LBS Research Online repository: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/
974/
Gu, Y and Botti, S and Faro, D
(2018)
Seeking and avoiding choice closure to enhance outcome satisfaction.
Journal of Consumer Research.
ISSN 0093-5301
(In Press)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucy025
Oxford University Press
https://academic.oup.com/jcr/advance-article/doi/1...
c© 2018 Journal of Consumer Research Inc. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an
article accepted for publication in Journal of Consumer Reearch following peer review. The version
of record: Yangjie Gu, Simona Botti, David Faro (2018) Seeking and Avoiding Choice Closure to
Enhance Outcome Satisfaction, Journal of Consumer Research, ucy025, is available online at
https://academic.oup.com/jcr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jcr/ucy025/4956242 and
https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucy025
Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LBS Research Online for purposes of
research and/or private study. Further distribution of the material, or use for any commercial gain, is
not permitted.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Seeking and Avoiding Choice Closure to Enhance Outcome Satisfaction  
 
 
 
 
 
 YANGJIE GU 
SIMONA BOTTI 
DAVID FARO 
  
2 
 
 
 
Yangjie Gu is assistant professor of marketing, HEC, Paris, 1 Rue de la Libération, 
78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France (gu@hec.fr). Simona Botti is professor of marketing, 
London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom 
(sbotti@london.edu). David Faro is associate professor of marketing, London Business 
School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom (dfaro@london.edu). The 
first two authors contributed equally to this research. Correspondence: Yangjie Gu. The 
authors thank the HEC Foundation and London Business School for financial support, 
the behavioral labs at Tilburg University and London Business School, and Zareen 
Choudhury, Nasima Kaker, Koen Lavrijssen, and Ileen Verbeek for their assistance in 
the data collection. They are also grateful to the Editor, Associate Editor, and three 
reviewers for their guidance throughout the process. Supplementary materials are 
included in the web appendix accompanying the online version of this article.  
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
Consumers gain choice closure when they perceive a sense of finality over a past 
decision and limit comparisons between the selected and the forgone options. We 
investigate consumers’ ability to make strategic use of choice closure to enhance 
outcome satisfaction. Seven studies show that consumers experience greater satisfaction 
when they achieve choice closure with an inferior outcome and when they do not 
achieve choice closure with a superior outcome; however, they expect to be more 
satisfied by avoiding choice closure with an inferior outcome and by seeking it with a 
superior outcome. We provide a rationale for this experience–expectation contrast based 
on rule overgeneralization. Consumers form their expectation on an implicit rule learned 
and internalized in a context in which it is appropriate and advantageous: when they aim 
to increase satisfaction with a future choice; however, consumers erroneously apply the 
same implicit rule to a different context, one in which they aim to increase satisfaction 
with a past choice. We conclude that consumers are unlikely to be able to make strategic 
use of choice closure to enhance satisfaction with the outcome of a decision they have 
made. 
 
Keywords: choice closure; outcome valence; satisfaction; prediction error; rule 
overgeneralization   
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“Honestly, though, does choice even come into it? Is it my fault that the good times fade 
to nothing while the bad ones burn forever bright?”  
David Sedaris, “Leviathan,” The New Yorker, 5 January 2015, 28–31. 
 
The opening quote refers to individuals’ tendency to perceive certain memories as more 
psychologically closed and others as more mentally alive. Psychologists have studied 
this varying tendency for closure with respect to life events (Beike and Wirth-Beaumont 
2005). Recently, the process by which people gain a sense of finality over their past has 
been examined in relation to choices (Gu, Botti, and Faro 2013): consumers achieving 
choice closure come to perceive a decision as finished and resolved and limit post-
choice comparisons between the selected and the rejected options. This sense of choice 
finality can be externally triggered without consumers being aware of it, for example by 
asking them to close a menu after selecting one of the featured food items.  
This paper studies whether consumers are able to use choice closure as a means 
to enhance satisfaction with the outcome of a decision they have made. Imagine a 
consumer who picked a bad dish at a long-awaited celebratory dinner. As suggested by 
the opening quote, this choice may be inherently more likely to “burn forever bright,” 
compelling the consumer to reconsider the potentially superior menu options she had 
discarded. If she intended to still enjoy her dinner, would she follow this natural 
inclination, or would she resist it and seek choice closure by keeping the menu closed? 
Now imagine a consumer picking a good dish who also wants to make the most of a 
celebration. Would he let his choice “fade to nothing,” neglecting to consider how 
disappointed he would have been with an inferior meal, or would he instead deliberately 
avoid choice closure by keeping the menu open?  
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The answers to these questions depend on consumers’ expectation for how 
choice closure affects satisfaction with inferior and superior decision outcomes. If this 
expectation were accurate, consumers would be able to make strategic use of choice 
closure to enhance satisfaction with past choices; on the contrary, we show that 
consumers’ expectation for choice closure does not match their experience. Specifically, 
we find that consumers are more satisfied when they achieve choice closure with an 
inferior decision outcome and when they do not achieve it with a superior decision 
outcome, but they expect to be more satisfied by avoiding choice closure with an 
inferior outcome and by seeking it with a superior outcome. We provide a rationale for 
this contrast between experience with and expectation for choice closure based on rule 
overgeneralization (Arkes and Ayton 1999). Consumers form their expectation on an 
implicit rule learned and internalized in a context in which it is advantageous: when the 
aim is to increase satisfaction with a future choice. However, consumers erroneously 
apply this rule to a different context, one in which the aim is to increase satisfaction with 
a past choice.  
 
CHOICE CLOSURE AND OUTCOME SATISFACTION  
 
Decisions typically require individuals to compare choice-set options in order to identify 
the best match with their preferences; once they have identified a preferred option, the 
decision is complete, and they are assumed to move on to consume and evaluate this 
option in isolation (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Literature on regret and option 
attachment (Carmon, Wertenbroch, and Zeelenberg 2003; Zeelenberg 1999), however, 
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indicates that individuals are often unable to deem the decision complete and tend to re-
assess the alternative already chosen relative to the alternatives already discarded. 
Choice closure helps consumers overcome this tendency by allowing them to perceive 
the decision as final and to limit comparisons between the selected and the forgone 
options (Gu et al. 2013).  
External interventions can, unbeknown to consumers, trigger choice closure and 
influence satisfaction with the outcome. Participants who closed a biscuit menu or 
covered chocolates with a lid after choosing from a large assortment, relative to those 
who did not, felt greater choice finality and made fewer post-choice comparisons (Gu et 
al. 2013). Comparisons across alternatives with both meaningful disadvantages and 
meaningful advantages tend to reduce the attractiveness of the selected option because 
the relative disadvantages loom larger than the relative advantages (Brenner, 
Rottenstreich, and Sood 1999; Tversky and Shafir 1992). Thus, the sense of finality 
triggered by the physical act of closure increased participants’ liking of the selected 
biscuit or chocolate because it limited comparisons that would have hurt its evaluation.  
If the limitation of unfavorable comparisons entailed by choice closure enhances 
outcome satisfaction, the limitation of favorable comparisons should have the opposite 
effect. Research suggests that consumers’ likelihood of engaging in comparisons that are 
unfavorable or favorable to the subjective value of a target depends on the perceived 
relative inferiority or superiority of that target, respectively (Hsee and Leclerc 1998; 
Simonson and Tversky 1992). In line with this literature, we expect that the perceived 
inferiority or superiority of the chosen option determines the types of post-choice 
comparisons that consumers make: an outcome seen, after the choice, as having mainly 
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disadvantages relative to the forgone options is likely to draw post-choice comparisons 
that hurt its evaluation, whereas an outcome seen as having mainly relative advantages 
is likely to draw comparisons that enhance its evaluation.  
We hypothesize that the effect of choice closure on consumers’ satisfaction with 
the outcome of a choice they have made depends on the perceived valence of that 
outcome. Achieving, versus not achieving, choice closure makes consumers more 
satisfied with an inferior outcome because the sense of finality limits comparisons that 
are unfavorable to the attractiveness of that outcome. Achieving, versus not achieving, 
choice closure, however, makes consumers less satisfied with a superior outcome 
because the sense of finality inhibits favorable comparisons:  
H1: Consumers are more satisfied when gaining choice closure with an inferior 
outcome and when not gaining choice closure with a superior outcome. 
Thus, choice closure may affect the subjective evaluation of inferior and superior 
decision outcomes and can be externally triggered without consumers being aware of it, 
for example by asking them to close a menu or a lid. It is yet unknown, however, 
whether consumers can be proactive about choice closure (Li, Wei, and Soman 2010): 
do they correctly anticipate the effect of choice closure on outcome satisfaction, and are 
they therefore able to make strategic use of external triggers of closure? For example, 
can the diner in the initial vignette properly forecast how closing the menu affects her 
enjoyment of the selected meal, and can she deliberately seek or avoid this trigger to 
enhance her satisfaction with the choice she has made?  
 
SEEKING AND AVOIDING CHOICE CLOSURE 
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In the previous section we hypothesized that the experience of satisfaction 
following choice closure depends on outcome valence; in this section we predict that 
outcome valence also influences the tendency to seek and avoid choice closure. We base 
this prediction on research that has investigated the relationship between valence and 
each of the two elements of choice closure: sense of finality and comparison limitation. 
Literature on psychological closure has found that unpleasant memories are perceived as 
inherently more emotionally vivid and less final than pleasant memories (Beike, Adams, 
and Wirth-Beaumont 2007; Beike and Wirth-Beaumont 2005). Literature on decision 
making has found that the generation of counterfactuals and the search for information 
about forgone options emerge more naturally as a result of negative, rather than positive, 
events (Kahneman and Miller 1986; Roese 1997). This research suggests that consumers’ 
natural reaction to an inferior outcome is to avoid choice closure whereas their natural 
reaction to a superior outcome is to seek choice closure.  
Natural reactions are well-practiced responses learned and internalized in a 
context in which they bring desirable outcomes (Arkes and Ayton 1999; Hsee and Ruan 
2016). Previous research indicates that the tendency to avoid choice closure with an 
inferior outcome, and to seek it with a superior outcome, is advantageous in the context 
of enhancing future satisfaction. The experience of a negative event motivates 
individuals to improve, as it stimulates upward counterfactuals that better prepare one 
for the next occasion and prompts the identification of corrective actions (Epstude and 
Roese 2008; Markman et al. 1993; Roese 1997). Thus, not achieving choice closure with 
an initial inferior outcome, as compared to achieving it, is more likely to encourage 
reconsideration of the decision process that led to that outcome. This reconsideration 
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allows consumers to learn from this process, improve a subsequent decision, and 
increase satisfaction with a similar future choice. 
The experience of a positive event, in contrast, reduces the motivation to 
improve, as further ameliorating a result that is already good enough may not be worth 
the required mental effort (Beike and Wirth-Beaumont 2005; Simon 1955). This 
resolution represents a more efficient allocation of cognitive resources and leads to 
lower regret and more positive affective and behavioral responses (Iyengar, Wells, and 
Schwartz 2006; Ma and Roese 2014; Schwartz et al. 2002). Thus, achieving choice 
closure with an initial superior outcome, as compared to not achieving it, is more likely 
to encourage settling on, rather than reconsidering, the decision process that led to that 
outcome. Settling on this process allows consumers to make a good-enough subsequent 
decision in an efficient fashion, reduce the discontent associated with spending 
unnecessary mental energy, and increase satisfaction with a similar future choice. 
In the next section we argue that the tendency to avoid choice closure with an 
inferior outcome and to seek it with a superior outcome, which is functional to 
enhancing future satisfaction, may however undermine consumers’ ability to make 
strategic use of choice closure to enhance satisfaction with a choice they have already 
made.  
 
CHOICE CLOSURE AND SATISFACTION IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 
 
Natural tendencies can be applied outside of the context in which they have been 
learned and internalized to become implicit rules driving a variety of judgments and 
behaviors (Arkes and Ayton 1999; Hsee and Ruan 2016; Wood and Neal 2007). This 
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generalization of a tendency is due to the associated sense of familiarity and fluency, 
which favors its automatic application across different contexts (Dhar and Gorlin 2013; 
Hsee and Hastie 2006). Thus, individuals often base their judgments on implicit rules 
instead of more deliberate assessments because these rules represent salient defaults that 
feel like the right answers leading to desired goals (Gilbert 2002; Kahneman and 
Frederick 2002; Schwarz and Clore 1983). 
We propose that the tendency to avoid choice closure with an inferior outcome 
and to seek it with a superior outcome, although functional to enhancing satisfaction 
with a future choice, becomes an implicit rule on which consumers rely when judging 
the effect of choice closure on satisfaction with the outcome of a choice they have 
already made. This generalization leads to an expectation that contrasts with our first 
hypothesis. H1 predicts consumers to be more satisfied when achieving choice closure 
with an inferior outcome and when not achieving choice closure with a superior 
outcome; based on the implicit rule, consumers would instead expect greater satisfaction 
by avoiding choice closure after selecting an inferior outcome and by seeking choice 
closure after selecting a superior outcome: 
H2: Consumers expect to be more satisfied by avoiding choice closure with an 
inferior outcome and by seeking choice closure with a superior outcome. 
The hypothesized contrast between experience with and expectation for choice 
closure is therefore an instance of rule overgeneralization: an implicit rule learned and 
internalized in a context in which it is appropriate and advantageous is incorrectly 
applied to another context and leads to undesirable consequences (Arkes and Ayton 
1999; Hsee and Ruan 2016). Although appropriate and advantageous in the context of 
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enhancing future satisfaction, the application of the implicit rule in the context of 
enhancing past satisfaction results in consumers being unlikely to make correct 
predictions about the effect of choice closure on outcome satisfaction and therefore to 
make strategic use of choice-closure triggers. 
We support this theorizing in two ways. First, we test whether consumers believe 
that the implicit rule is functional to enhancing satisfaction with the outcome of a similar 
future choice. Specifically, we hypothesize that consumers anticipate not achieving 
choice closure with an initial inferior outcome and achieving choice closure with an 
initial superior outcome to increase satisfaction with a subsequent similar choice:  
H3: Consumers anticipate they will be more (less) satisfied with the outcome of 
a subsequent similar choice after not gaining choice closure with an initial 
inferior (superior) outcome.  
Second, we test whether reliance on the implicit rule is attenuated when 
consumers are made to consider the possibility that its default application is 
inappropriate (Gilbert 2002; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Schwarz and Clore 
1983).We hypothesize that consumers are less likely to base their expectation for how 
choice closure affects past satisfaction on the implicit rule when it is made salient to 
them that this choice is a one-time occasion, and that there will not be a subsequent 
similar choice:    
H4:  When it is more, versus less, salient that a choice is a one-time occasion, 
consumers are less likely to expect greater satisfaction by avoiding choice 
closure with an inferior outcome and by seeking choice closure with a 
superior outcome.  
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We tested our hypotheses in seven studies. Whereas previous research has used 
physical acts as external triggers of closure (Gu et al. 2013; Li et al. 2010), in this paper 
we triggered choice closure via visual cues.   
 
STUDY 1A 
 
Study 1a tests H1, which predicts that consumers are more satisfied when they achieve 
choice closure with an inferior outcome than when they do not achieve it, and that this 
pattern reverses in the context of a superior outcome.  
 
Method 
 
This study employed a 2 (choice closure: trigger vs. no trigger)  2 (outcome valence: 
inferior vs. superior) between-subjects design and was conducted on Prolific Academic. 
Four hundred three respondents were paid a nominal fee for their participation.  
Participants chose one video clip to watch from a set of twelve 30-second video 
clips portraying animals. These videos were pre-tested to be similar in terms of valence. 
One hundred fifty-three Amazon Mechanical Turk workers rated on 9-point scales how 
much they enjoyed and liked four randomly chosen video clips out of a sample of 24 
video clips. Twelve video clips with a similar average score were selected to form the 
assortment used in the main study (Mlowest = 6.50, SD = 2.16; Mhighest = 6.94, SD = 1.87).  
The video-clip assortment included snapshots of the videos featuring short, 
descriptive titles (e.g., “Naughty kitten and sleepy cat”). After participants chose a video 
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to watch, we administered the outcome-valence manipulation by showing them a graph, 
which allegedly compared survey ratings of the selected video relative to the average 
survey ratings of all the videos in the assortment. In the inferior-outcome condition, the 
ratings of the selected video were below average; in the superior-outcome condition, 
they were above average (Appendix A). 
The choice-closure manipulation was administered while participants watched 
the video they had chosen. In both conditions, an image of the original video-clip 
assortment appeared at the top of the video; in the trigger condition, this image 
displayed the snapshot of the selected video clip appended with a “selected” label and 
the snapshots of the forgone video clips appended with “not selected” labels (Image 1). 
In the no-trigger condition, this image displayed the selected and the forgone video-clip 
snapshots without labels (Image 2; Appendix B). A separate pre-test confirmed that 
Image 1 (with labels) was more likely to trigger both elements of choice closure—sense 
of finality and comparison limitation—than Image 2 (without labels; Appendix C).  
After watching the video, participants reported their satisfaction by answering 
the following questions: “How satisfied are you with the video that you chose?” and 
“How much did you enjoy the video that you chose?” (1 = not at all; 9 = completely).  
 
Results 
 
Responses were averaged into an overall satisfaction score (α = 0.91) and submitted to a 
2 (choice closure: trigger vs. no trigger)  2 (outcome valence: inferior vs. superior) 
ANOVA. There was no main effect of choice closure (Mtrigger = 7.19, SD = 1.92; Mno 
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trigger = 7.22, SD = 1.98; F(1, 399) < 1, NS) or valence (Minferior = 7.27, SD = 1.83; 
Msuperior = 7.16, SD = 2.03; F(1, 399) < 1, NS), but the hypothesized interaction was 
significant (F(1, 399) = 12.38, p < .0001; figure 1). 
Insert figure 1 about here 
Contrast analyses on this interaction confirmed H1. In the inferior-outcome 
condition, participants who were exposed to the choice-closure trigger were more 
satisfied (M = 7.65, SD = 1.33) than those who were not exposed to it (M = 6.91, 
SD = 2.14; F(1, 399) = 6.50, p < .05). However, in the superior-outcome condition, 
participants who were not exposed to the trigger were more satisfied than those who 
were (Mtrigger = 6.85, SD = 2.21; Mno trigger = 7.46, SD = 1.80; F(1, 399) = 5.90, p < .05).  
 
STUDY 1B 
 
Study 1b tests H2, which predicts that consumers expect to enhance outcome 
satisfaction by deliberately avoiding, versus seeking, choice closure with an inferior 
outcome and by seeking, versus avoiding, choice closure with a superior outcome.  
 
Method 
 
The study employed a between-subjects design with a single two-level factor (outcome 
valence: inferior vs. superior). One hundred fourteen participants recruited through 
Prolific Academic took part in exchange for a nominal fee. 
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The initial procedure was the same as in study 1a: participants chose a video to 
watch from the same assortment of 12 videos and were shown the information 
portraying this video as either inferior or superior to the forgone ones (Appendix A). 
Next, they were presented with the two images used in study 1a (Image 1, featuring the 
labelled options, and Image 2, without labels; Appendix B) and told that one of the two 
would appear at the top of the video as they watched it. Participants then answered the 
question “Which one of these two images do you think might lead to greater satisfaction 
with the video that you chose?” on a bipolar scale (1 = definitely Image 1; 9 = definitely 
Image 2). 
 
Results 
 
A one-way ANOVA (outcome valence: inferior vs. superior) revealed that participants 
in the inferior-outcome condition, relative to those in the superior-outcome condition, 
thought that Image 2, which did not feature the trigger, would be more likely to lead to 
greater outcome satisfaction than Image 1, which featured the trigger (Minferior = 6.13, 
SD = 2.67; Msuperior = 5.09, SD = 2.77; F(1, 112) = 4.14, p < .05). In other words, 
participants faced with an inferior outcome expected that avoiding choice closure would 
be more likely to enhance outcome satisfaction with the choice they had made than 
seeking it; similarly, participants faced with a superior outcome expected that seeking 
choice closure would be more likely to enhance outcome satisfaction than avoiding it.  
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Discussion 
 
Studies 1a and 1b represent a first demonstration that consumers’ experience with 
choice closure contradicts their expectation. Study 1a showed that participants were 
more satisfied when they achieved choice closure with an inferior outcome and when 
they did not achieve it with a superior outcome. Study 1b, however, showed that 
participants expected to be more satisfied by avoiding choice closure with an inferior 
outcome and by seeking it with a superior outcome.  
To demonstrate the experience–expectation contrast we used different 
experimental procedures. In study 1a, participants were separately exposed to either the 
image that included the choice-closure trigger or the image that did not include the 
trigger. This design is consistent with previous research (Gu et al. 2013; Li et al. 2013) 
and allowed us to test how the inclusion, versus exclusion, of the trigger affected 
outcome satisfaction unbeknown to participants. In study 1b, participants were instead 
simultaneously exposed to both images; this design allowed us to test whether they were 
able to forecast the effect of the inclusion and exclusion of the trigger on outcome 
satisfaction, and determine in a deliberate manner which setting would be more likely to 
enhance it. Similar procedures have been used in research on affective forecasting (e.g., 
Nelson and Meyvis 2008, study 1; Gilbert et al. 1998, study 2). However, to address 
potential concerns about the difference in procedures across the two studies, we 
replicated the results of study 1b by separately exposing participants to each image. We 
report this study in the Web Appendix.  
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The next two studies aim to replicate the experience–expectation contrast 
observed in studies 1a and 1b with different stimuli. Study 2a also tests the proposed 
mechanism for the effect of choice closure on satisfaction.  
 
STUDY 2A 
 
According to our theorizing, achieving choice closure with an inferior outcome limits 
unfavorable comparisons that would decrease satisfaction, and achieving choice closure 
with a superior outcome limits favorable comparisons that would increase satisfaction. 
To test this process, in study 2a we manipulated the extent to which participants 
engaged in comparisons orthogonally to choice closure. Specifically, we asked half the 
participants (forced-comparison condition) to simulate the comparison type presumed 
by the theory—unfavorable for inferior outcomes and favorable for superior outcomes—
regardless of whether they were exposed to the choice-closure trigger; the other half 
(control condition) were not asked to make a specific comparison type. We reasoned 
that when the inhibition of comparisons associated with choice closure is disrupted by 
forced comparisons, the advantages of gaining choice closure with an inferior outcome 
and the disadvantages of gaining it with a superior outcome would be offset. Thus, we 
predicted the differences in satisfaction across the trigger and no-trigger conditions 
obtained in study 1a to replicate in the control condition but to be attenuated in the 
forced-comparison condition.  
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Method 
 
Study 2a used a 2 (choice closure: trigger vs. no trigger) × 2 (outcome valence: inferior 
vs. superior) × 2 (comparison: control vs. forced comparison) between-subjects design. 
Two hundred forty-three students recruited from different universities in the UK 
participated in exchange for £10. 
Participants sat in individual cubicles before a computer. They were asked to 
imagine purchasing a box of same-flavor chocolates and to select the flavor from an 
assortment of 12 different chocolate flavors. Each chocolate flavor was illustrated with a 
picture, a name, and a description (e.g., Exotique: Passion fruit jam and caramel encased 
in dark chocolate). After selecting a chocolate flavor, participants moved on to the next 
screen, in which outcome valence was manipulated by providing ratings of the selected 
chocolate relative to the forgone ones as in study 1a; this time, the quantitative ratings 
were complemented by qualitative reviews (Appendix A). Next, the choice-closure 
manipulation was administered: in the trigger condition, participants were shown a 
screen displaying the selected chocolate together with the rejected ones; each of the 
rejected chocolates was appended with “rejected” labels. In the no-trigger condition, 
both the selected and the rejected chocolates were displayed without labels (Appendix 
B). Finally, participants ate the chocolate they chose.  
The comparison manipulation was administered while participants were eating 
the chocolate. In the control condition, all participants were asked to write down 
anything that came to mind about the chocolates. In the forced-comparison condition, 
participants eating a chocolate portrayed as inferior were asked to describe how the 
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selected chocolate flavor might have been worse than the other flavors in the assortment 
(unfavorable comparisons); participants eating a chocolate portrayed as superior were 
asked to describe how the selected chocolate flavor might have been better than the 
other flavors (favorable comparisons). At the end of the study, participants reported their 
satisfaction by answering the same questions as in study 1a.  
We predicted that we would replicate the results of study 1a in the control 
condition: participants in the inferior-outcome condition would be more satisfied after 
being exposed to the choice-closure trigger than after not being exposed to it, and 
participants in the superior-outcome condition would be more satisfied after not being 
exposed to the trigger than after being exposed to it. In the forced-comparison condition, 
we predicted an attenuation of these differences in satisfaction: instructing participants 
with an inferior outcome to generate unfavorable comparisons would work against the 
positive effect of choice closure, and instructing participants with a superior outcome to 
generate favorable comparisons would counteract its negative effect.  
 
Results 
 
A 2 (choice closure: trigger vs. no trigger) × 2 (outcome valence: inferior vs. superior) × 
2 (comparison: control vs. forced comparison) ANOVA was conducted on the average 
of the two-item satisfaction measure (α = 0.94). The main effects of choice closure 
(Mtrigger = 6.92, SD = 1.52; Mno trigger = 6.93, SD = 1.60; F(1, 235) < 1, NS) and 
comparison (Mcontrol = 7.00, SD = 1.46; Mforced comparison = 6.84, SD = 1.66; F(1, 235) < 1, 
NS) were not significant, but the main effect of valence was significant (Minferior = 6.43, 
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SD = 1.69; Msuperior = 7.54, SD = 1.09; F(1, 235) = 37.43, p < .0001). The ANOVA also 
revealed a significant three-way interaction (F(1, 235) = 7.10, p < .01).  
Contrast analyses focused on the two choice-closure  outcome-valence 
interactions separately for the control and forced-comparison conditions (figure 2). In 
the control condition, the main effect of choice closure was not significant 
(Mtrigger = 7.02, SD = 1.23; Mno trigger = 6.99, SD = 1.67; F(1, 235) < 1, NS) but that of 
valence was significant (Minferior = 6.67, SD = 1.56; Msuperior = 7.41, SD = 1.21; F(1, 
235) = 8.51, p < .005). The interaction was significant (F(1, 235) = 8.41, p < .005): 
replicating study 1a, in the inferior-outcome condition participants who were exposed to 
the trigger (M = 7.01, SD = 1.20) were more satisfied than those who were not 
(M = 6.32, SD = 1.81; F(1, 235) = 4.30, p < .05); in the superior-outcome condition, 
participants who were not exposed to the trigger were more satisfied than those who 
were (Mtrigger = 7.02, SD = 1.29; Mno trigger = 7.78, SD = 1.02; F(1, 235) = 4.15, p < .05). 
In the forced-comparison condition, the main effect of choice closure was not 
significant (Mtrigger = 6.81, SD = 1.80; Mno trigger = 6.88, SD = 1.52; F(1, 235) < 1, NS) 
but that of valence was significant (Minferior = 6.15, SD = 1.81; Msuperior = 7.68, 
SD = 0.93; F(1, 235) = 31.78, p < .0001). As expected, the interaction was not 
significant (F(1, 235) < 1, NS): participants experienced the same level of satisfaction 
with an inferior and a superior outcome regardless of whether they were exposed to the 
trigger or not (inferior outcome: Mtrigger = 5.98, SD = 1.92; Mno trigger = 6.31, SD = 1.71; 
F(1, 235) < 1, NS; superior outcome: Mtrigger = 7.77, SD = 1.01; Mno trigger = 7.58, 
SD = 0.84; F(1, 235) < 1, NS).  
Insert figure 2 about here 
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STUDY 2B 
 
Method 
 
As in study 1b, the design of study 2b included only one factor, outcome valence 
(inferior vs. superior). One hundred four students from a university in the Netherlands 
received €7 to participate. 
The initial procedure was similar to that of study 2a. Each participant sat in a 
cubicle before a computer and was asked to choose one chocolate flavor from the same 
selection used in study 2a. Following the choice, the outcome-valence manipulation was 
administered. Participants read an ostensibly independent report rating the 12 chocolate 
flavors, which indicates that the overall rating for the selected chocolate was among the 
last three (inferior-outcome condition) or top three (superior-outcome condition).  
Next, participants were asked to imagine logging in to the same website to check 
their purchase history webpage, which could feature one of two designs: as in study 2a, 
Webpage A displayed the chosen chocolate together with the forgone chocolates 
labelled as “rejected”; Webpage B displayed both the chosen and the forgone chocolates 
without labels (Appendix B). Participants then answered the question “Which one of 
these two webpages do you think might lead to greater satisfaction with the chocolate 
that you chose?” by choosing between Webpage A and B.  
Finally, participants answered a series of questions to ensure that the presence, 
versus absence, of the “rejected” labels triggered a greater sense of finality (“To what 
extent would each of these two webpages help you think of the chocolate decision as 
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complete / reach closure about your chocolate choice?”) and induced fewer comparisons 
(“To what extent does each of these two webpages make you keep comparing your 
chosen chocolate with the chocolates that you have not chosen / thinking about the 
chocolates that you have not chosen?”). All these manipulation-check questions were 
answered on bipolar scales (1 = definitely Webpage A; 9 = definitely Webpage B).  
 
Results 
 
Manipulation check. The two items measuring finality (α = 0.77) and the two 
items measuring comparisons (α = 0.76) were averaged into single scores. One-sample 
t-tests using the scale’s midpoint as a benchmark confirmed that participants considered 
Webpage A, which included the “rejected” labels, to be more effective in delivering a 
sense of decision finality and in limiting comparisons than Webpage B, which did not 
include these labels (finality: M = 4.04, SD = 2.54; t(103) = −3.86, p < .0001; 
comparison: M = 6.13, SD = 2.51; t(103) = 4.60, p < .0001).  
Expectation. We employed a binary logistic regression to examine the influence 
of outcome valence (0 = inferior; 1= superior) on webpage choice (0 = Webpage A; 1 = 
Webpage B). Confirming H2, this regression yielded a significant effect (Wald 
χ2(1) = 18.84, p < .0001): more participants in the inferior-outcome condition (75.47%) 
than in the superior-outcome condition (31.37%) thought that the webpage without the 
“rejected” labels would lead to greater satisfaction with the selected outcome than the 
webpage with the “rejected” labels. Thus, participants who selected a chocolate 
portrayed as inferior expected that avoiding choice closure would be more likely to 
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enhance satisfaction with that chocolate than seeking choice closure; similarly, 
participants who selected a chocolate portrayed as superior expected that seeking choice 
closure would be more likely to enhance satisfaction than avoiding it. 
 
Discussion 
 
Studies 2a and 2b replicated the experience–expectation contrast observed in studies 1a 
and 1b: participants who achieved choice closure after selecting an inferior outcome 
were more satisfied than those who did not, and participants who did not achieve choice 
closure after selecting a superior outcome were more satisfied than those who did. 
However, participants expected that avoiding choice closure with an inferior outcome 
and seeking choice closure with a superior outcome would be more likely to enhance 
their satisfaction with that outcome. Study 2a also supported the proposed process 
linking choice closure to satisfaction: the greater satisfaction following closure with an 
inferior outcome and no-closure with a superior outcome was attenuated when forced 
comparisons offset the unfavorable and favorable comparisons limited by perceived 
finality, respectively.  
The experience–expectation contrast demonstrated in these initial studies implies 
that consumers are unlikely to be able to make strategic use of choice closure to enhance 
satisfaction with the outcome of past decisions. The remainder of the paper provides 
evidence supporting the rationale for this contrast: consumers form their expectation on 
the implicit rule of avoiding choice closure with an inferior outcome and seeking it with 
a superior outcome, which is advantageous in the context of enhancing satisfaction with 
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a future choice but is inappropriately applied in the context of enhancing satisfaction 
with a past choice.      
The next two studies test H3, according to which consumers believe that the 
implicit rule is advantageous in the context of enhancing future satisfaction. Both 
studies asked participants to make two choices from the same assortment; study 3a tests 
whether consumers anticipate that not gaining closure with an initial inferior outcome 
facilitates improving a subsequent similar choice and enhances satisfaction with that 
choice; study 3b tests whether they anticipate that gaining choice closure with an initial 
superior outcome facilitates making an efficient, good-enough subsequent similar choice 
and enhances satisfaction with that choice.   
 
STUDY 3A 
 
Method 
 
Study 3a used a 2 (choice closure: trigger vs. no trigger) × 2 (initial outcome valence: 
inferior vs. superior) between-subjects design. Three hundred ninety-four Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers participated in this online study for a nominal fee. 
Participants read that they would make two choices from the same selection of 
chocolates used in the previous studies. After making the first choice, participants were 
exposed to the same manipulations of valence and choice closure as in study 2a. 
Participants then read that they would return to the same chocolate selection to make a 
second choice with the intent of picking a better chocolate. Before repeating the choice 
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they were asked: “How much do you think that making the first choice helps you 
improve your second choice?” and after repeating the choice they were asked: “How 
satisfied would you be with the chocolate that you chose?” and “How much would you 
enjoy the chocolate that you chose?” All these questions were answered on 9-point 
scales (1 = not at all; 9 = extremely). 
We predicted that participants who were not exposed to the choice-closure 
trigger after selecting an initial inferior outcome, relative to those who were, would be 
more likely to think that this first choice helps them improve the second choice and to 
anticipate greater satisfaction with it. As initial superior outcomes do not provide the 
same motivation, we did not expect a difference between the trigger and no-trigger 
conditions on any of these measures.    
 
Results 
 
Improving a second choice. Participants’ ratings of the extent to which they 
thought making the first choice helps them improve the second choice were submitted to 
a 2 (choice closure: trigger vs. no trigger) × 2 (initial outcome valence: inferior vs. 
superior) ANOVA. This analysis yielded a not-significant main effect of choice closure 
(Mtrigger = 5.81, SD = 1.94; Mno trigger = 5.89, SD = 1.86; F(1, 390) < 1, NS), a significant 
main effect of initial outcome valence (Minferior = 6.16, SD = 1.81; Msuperior = 5.55, 
SD = 1.93; F(1, 390) = 10.41, p = .001), and the predicted interaction (F(1, 390) = 5.09, 
p < .05; figure 3): in the inferior-outcome condition, participants who were not exposed 
to the choice-closure trigger after the first choice anticipated that this first choice would 
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help them improve the second choice more than those who were exposed to the trigger 
(Mtrigger = 5.90, SD = 1.89; Mno trigger = 6.42, SD = 1.70; F(1, 390) = 3.80, p = .05). In the 
superior-outcome condition, this difference was not significant (Mtrigger = 5.71, 
SD = 2.00; Mno trigger = 5.39, SD = 1.87; F(1, 390) = 1.54, NS). 
Anticipated satisfaction with a second choice. A 2 (choice closure: trigger vs. no 
trigger) × 2 (initial outcome valence: inferior vs. superior) ANOVA was conducted on 
the average of the two items measuring anticipated satisfaction with the second choice 
(α = 0.89). The main effects of choice closure (Mtrigger = 7.11, SD = 1.29; Mno 
trigger = 7.30, SD = 1.21; F(1, 390) = 2.38, NS) and initial outcome valence 
(Minferior = 7.15, SD = 1.17; Msuperior = 7.25, SD = 1.33; F(1, 390) < 1, NS) were not 
significant, but the predicted interaction was (F(1, 390) = 4.19, p < .05; figure 4): in the 
inferior-outcome condition, participants who were not exposed to the trigger (M = 7.38, 
SD = 1.05) reported greater anticipated satisfaction than those who were exposed 
(M = 6.93, SD = 1.24; F(1, 390) = 6.38, p < .05); in the superior-outcome condition, this 
difference was not significant (Mtrigger = 7.29, SD = 1.31; Mno trigger = 7.22, SD = 1.35; 
F(1, 390) < 1, NS). 
Insert figures 3 and 4 about here 
STUDY 3B 
 
Method 
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Study 3b used the same design as study 3a. Three hundred fifty-five Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers participated in this online study for a nominal fee. 
The procedure and manipulations were the same as in study 3a. In study 3b, 
however, participants read that they would return to the same chocolate selection to 
make a second choice with the intent to pick a good-enough chocolate without spending 
unnecessary effort. Before repeating their choice participants were asked: “How much 
do you think that making the first choice helps you select a good-enough chocolate in 
your second choice?” (1 = not at all; 9 = extremely), and after repeating their choice 
they were asked the same questions about anticipated satisfaction as in study 3a. 
We predicted that participants who were exposed to the choice-closure trigger 
after selecting an initial superior outcome, relative to those who were not, would be 
more likely to think that this first choice helps them make an efficient, good-enough 
second choice and to anticipate greater satisfaction with it. As initial inferior outcomes 
do not provide the same motivation, we did not expect a difference between the trigger 
and no-trigger conditions on any of these measures.    
 
Results 
 
Making a good-enough second choice. A 2 (choice closure: trigger vs. no 
trigger) × 2 (initial outcome valence: inferior vs. superior) ANOVA was conducted on 
the extent to which participants thought the first choice helps them pick a good-enough 
second chocolate. The main effects of choice closure (Mtrigger = 6.14, SD = 2.04; Mno 
trigger = 5.93, SD = 1.75; F(1, 351) = 1.10, NS) and initial outcome valence 
28 
 
(Minferior = 6.08, SD = 1.91; Msuperior = 5.99, SD = 1.91; F(1, 351) < 1, NS) were not 
significant, but the predicted interaction was significant (F(1, 351) = 4.28, p < .05; 
figure 5). In the superior-outcome condition, participants who were exposed to the 
choice-closure trigger after the first choice anticipated that this first choice would help 
them choose a second good-enough chocolate more than those who were not exposed to 
the trigger (Mtrigger = 6.30, SD = 1.95; Mno trigger = 5.67, SD = 1.82; F(1, 351) = 4.80, 
p < .05). In the inferior-outcome condition, this difference was not significant 
(Mtrigger = 5.98, SD = 2.13; Mno trigger = 6.18, SD = 1.64; F(1, 351) < 1, NS). 
Anticipated satisfaction with a second choice. A 2 (choice closure: trigger vs. no 
trigger) × 2 (initial outcome valence: inferior vs. superior) ANOVA was conducted on 
the average of the two measures of anticipated satisfaction (α = 0.89). The main effect of 
choice closure was significant (Mtrigger = 7.20, SD = 1.28; Mno trigger = 6.91, SD = 1.24; 
F(1, 351) = 4.70, p < .05), whereas that of initial outcome valence was not 
(Minferior = 7.14, SD = 1.17; Msuperior = 6.98, SD = 1.35; F(1, 351) = 1.59, NS). The 
predicted interaction was significant (F(1, 351) = 5.79, p < .05; figure 6): in the 
superior-outcome condition, participants who were exposed to the trigger (M = 7.28, 
SD = 1.28) anticipated greater satisfaction than those who were not exposed (M = 6.67, 
SD = 1.37; F(1, 351) = 10.32, p = .001), but this difference was not significant in the 
inferior-outcome condition (Mtrigger = 7.12, SD = 1.28; Mno trigger = 7.16, SD = 1.04; F(1, 
351) < 1, NS). 
Insert figures 5 and 6 about here 
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Discussion 
 
Studies 3a and 3b confirm H3, according to which consumers believe that the implicit 
rule of avoiding choice closure with an inferior outcome and seeking it with a superior 
outcome is advantageous in the context of enhancing future satisfaction. Participants in 
study 3a anticipated that not achieving choice closure with an initial inferior outcome 
would improve a subsequent similar choice and enhance satisfaction with it; those in 
study 3b anticipated that achieving choice closure with an initial superior outcome 
would facilitate an efficient, good-enough subsequent similar choice and enhance 
satisfaction with it.  
The next study tests whether consumers overgeneralize the implicit rule from the 
context of enhancing satisfaction with a future choice to that of enhancing satisfaction 
with a past choice. This overgeneralization implies that consumers automatically rely on 
the implicit rule in forming their expectation for the effect of choice closure on 
satisfaction with the outcome of a decision they have already made; however, if 
consumers were compelled to consider the potential inappropriateness of this default 
application of the implicit rule, they would be less likely to rely on it. Specifically, study 
4 tests H4, according to which making salient to consumers that a choice will not be 
followed by a subsequent similar one attenuates their expectation that avoiding choice 
closure with an inferior outcome and seeking it with a superior outcome enhances 
satisfaction with that outcome. 
This study also addresses an alternative explanation for the expectation that 
avoiding choice closure with an inferior outcome enhances satisfaction. This expectation 
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could be based on the notion that ruminating on an inferior past choice reduces the 
discomfort of having made that choice (Festinger 1957; Wilson and Gilbert 2008). As 
the desire to reduce discomfort with an inferior past choice is equally relevant both 
when the choice is assumed to be repeated and when it is a one-time occurrence, this 
alternative explanation would not predict the difference between these two conditions 
that is hypothesized in H4.  
      
STUDY 4 
 
Method 
 
This study employed a 2 (outcome valence: inferior vs. superior) × 2 (choice context: 
control vs. no repetition) between-subjects design. Two hundred seventeen Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers took part in this online study in exchange for a nominal fee. 
All participants were told that they would choose one chocolate flavor from the 
same assortment used in the previous studies. In the control condition, participants 
proceeded to make this choice. In the no-repetition condition, participants read a 
vignette before making their choice; this vignette made salient to them that the choice 
would not be followed by a subsequent similar one. In the inferior-outcome (superior-
outcome) condition, participants read:  
Sometimes you can make more than one choice from the same chocolate 
selection. For example, one day you choose one chocolate from a selection and 
eat it; the day after you can go back to the same selection and choose again. In 
this situation your first choice can help you improve your second choice (find a 
good-enough chocolate the second time around in an efficient way, meaning 
without spending too much effort). Other times you cannot make more than one 
31 
 
choice from the same chocolate selection. For example, one day you choose one 
chocolate from a selection and eat it; the day after that initial selection is 
unavailable and you choose again from a completely different selection. In this 
situation your first choice cannot help you improve your second choice (find a 
good-enough chocolate the second time around in an efficient way).  
Participants were then asked to imagine being in the second situation, in which 
they could not make more than one choice from the same selection. 
After choosing, participants in both conditions were given the same survey 
results used in study 2b to manipulate valence. Next, they were shown two webpages: 
Webpage 1, which featured the choice-closure trigger used in study 1b, and Webpage 2, 
which did not feature this trigger (Appendix B); a pre-test confirmed the effectiveness of 
this manipulation (Appendix C). Finally, participants answered the question “Which of 
the two webpages do you think would make you more satisfied with the chocolate that 
you chose?” on a bipolar scale (1 = definitely Webpage 1; 9 = definitely Webpage 2).  
 
Results 
 
A 2 (outcome valence: inferior vs. superior) × 2 (choice context: control vs. no 
repetition) ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of valence (Minferior = 6.43, SD = 
2.61; Msuperior = 5.38, SD = 2.85; F(1, 213) = 6.61, p < .05), a not-significant main effect 
of context (Mcontrol = 6.02, SD = 2.93; Mno repetition = 5.90, SD = 2.55; F(1, 213) < 1, NS), 
and the predicted significant interaction (F(1, 213) = 9.71, p < .005; figure 7). 
Insert figure 7 about here 
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Contrast analyses showed that results of studies 1b and 2b were replicated in the 
control condition: participants with an inferior outcome, relative to those with a superior 
outcome, thought that Webpage 2, without choice-closure trigger, would be more likely 
to enhance satisfaction than Webpage 1, with trigger (Minferior = 6.89, SD = 2.57; 
Msuperior = 4.80, SD = 2.98; F(1, 213) = 17.81, p < .001). This difference was not 
significant in the no-repetition condition (Minferior = 5.80, SD = 2.55; Msuperior = 6.00, SD 
= 2.58; F(1, 213) < 1, NS).  
In line with H4, contrast analyses showed that when the outcome was inferior, 
the expectation that Webpage 2, without choice-closure trigger, would lead to greater 
satisfaction than Webpage 1, with trigger, was lower in the no-repetition than in the 
control condition (Mno repetition = 5.80, SD = 2.55; Mcontrol = 6.89, SD = 2.57; F(1, 213) = 
4.83, p < .05); when the outcome was superior, the expectation that Webpage 2 would 
lead to greater satisfaction than Webpage 1 was higher in the no-repetition than in the 
control condition (Mno repetition = 6.00, SD = 2.58, Mcontrol = 4.80, SD = 2.98; F(1, 213) = 
4.90, p < .05). In other words, relative to those in the control condition, participants in 
the no-repetition condition were less likely to expect that avoiding choice closure would 
enhance satisfaction with an inferior outcome and that seeking choice closure would 
enhance satisfaction with a superior outcome.  
 
Discussion  
 
Results of study 4 supported our proposed overgeneralization account and ruled out a 
potential alternative explanation according to which choice closure could reduce the 
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discomfort of having selected an inferior outcome. When it was made salient to 
participants that the choice would not be repeated in the future, they were less likely to 
expect that avoiding choice closure enhances satisfaction with an inferior outcome and 
that seeking it enhances satisfaction with a superior outcome.    
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Individuals are naturally inclined to relive past undesirable events and to settle on 
desirable ones. We show that this tendency prevents consumers from making strategic 
use of choice closure to enhance satisfaction with choices they have made. 
We present three main results. First, consumers’ satisfaction following choice 
closure depends on outcome valence. Studies 1a and 2a demonstrate that participants are 
more satisfied after achieving choice closure with an inferior outcome and after not 
achieving it with a superior outcome. Second, consumers’ expectation contrasts their 
experienced satisfaction. Studies 1b and 2b show that participants expect greater 
satisfaction by deliberately avoiding choice closure with an inferior outcome and by 
seeking it with a superior outcome. Third, this experience–expectation contrast is the 
result of rule overgeneralization. Consumers form their expectation on the implicit rule 
of avoiding choice closure with an inferior outcome and seeking it with a superior 
outcome. This rule is appropriate in the context of enhancing satisfaction with a future 
choice because it facilitates improving or making an efficient, good-enough subsequent 
choice, respectively; however, when applied to the context of a past choice, it leads to 
the undesirable consequence of reducing, rather than enhancing, satisfaction. Studies 3a 
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and 3b confirm that participants anticipate that not achieving choice closure with an 
initial inferior outcome and achieving it with an initial superior outcome increases 
satisfaction with a subsequent similar choice. Study 4 shows that participants are less 
likely to expect that avoiding choice closure with an inferior outcome and seeking it 
with a superior outcome enhances satisfaction when they are explicitly told that the 
choice will not be followed by a subsequent similar one.   
These results contribute to literature examining how a psychological separation 
between the present and the past influences subjective well-being. Li et al. (2010) 
question whether self-help practices involving conscious efforts to physically enclose 
written memories of negative events might be effective in gaining psychological closure 
over those events. Related research on the “fresh start effect” show that naturally arising 
time markers create opportunities to leave one’s imperfections behind and speculate that 
individuals might intentionally create fresh starts to behave better (Dai, Milkman, and 
Riis 2014). However, the strategic use of closure triggers and temporal markers has not 
been explored. Our results provide insight into individuals’ deliberate assessments of 
how choice closure influences outcome satisfaction.   
Our findings also clarify how choice closure relates to cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger 1957), the psychological immune system (Gilbert et al. 1998), and rumination 
(Martin and Tesser 1996). The literature on cognitive dissonance and the psychological 
immune system investigates only processes that reduce aversive responses to freely 
made choices and bolster the value of selected relative to forgone options. Similarly, the 
literature on rumination, or the tendency to engage in conscious and repetitive thoughts 
about an instrumental theme, typically involves thoughts about a negative event or an 
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unattainable goal (Whitmer and Gotlib 2013). We examine instead both the negative and 
the positive effects of choice closure on outcome satisfaction and specific types of 
thoughts—comparative assessments between the selected and the forgone options—that 
can be either negative (unfavorable comparisons) or positive (favorable comparisons). 
Finally, we indicate that in the case of choice closure, consumers behave in a 
way that favors future satisfaction. Most research documents instances in which the 
default response serves current satisfaction at the expense of future satisfaction, for 
example in the context of food consumption and financial decision making (Shiv and 
Fedorikhin 1999; Thaler and Benartzi 2004). Our work contrasts with this research but 
is consistent with emerging research on hyperopia, which shows a tendency to serve 
future objectives at the expense of short-term hedonic utility (Kivetz and Keinan 2006).  
From a managerial perspective, this paper relates to situations in which the post-
choice evaluation of the outcome is affected by information that was unavailable during 
the decision, for example when consumers review experts’ comments or hear about 
peers’ experiences after having made a purchase (Cooke, Meyvis, and Schwartz 2001; 
Faro 2010). Whereas previous work has focused on physical interventions (Gu et al. 
2013; Li et al. 2010), this research shows that in these situations choice closure can be 
triggered via visual cues, a possibility that is especially relevant to online companies.   
The opening quote suggests that individuals do not have control over the fact 
that past negative decisions “burn forever bright” whereas past positive decisions “fade 
to nothing.” We contend instead that achieving closure can be a matter of choice: 
consumers deliberately avoid closure with past inferior outcomes and seek closure with 
past superior outcomes. Whether this is a fault or a blessing, however, depends on 
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whether they aim to increase satisfaction with a choice they have already made or will 
make in the future.  
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Data Collection Information 
 
The current paper includes seven studies. The first author collected data for studies 1a 
and 1b through Prolific Academic in the winter of 2016. The first author supervised the 
data collection for study 2a by research assistants at Tilburg University Lab in the 
autumn of 2013. The three authors jointly supervised the collection of data for study 2b 
by research assistants at the London Business School Behavioural Lab in the autumn of 
2012. Data for studies 3a, 3b, and 4 were collected by the first author through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk in the spring of 2015 and autumn of 2016. The first author was 
primarily responsible for the data analysis. Data were discussed throughout the research 
project by all authors. 
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Appendix A: Outcome-Valence Manipulation  
Studies 1a and 1b 
 
   Superior outcome          Inferior outcome  
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Studies 2a, 3a, and 3b  
Superior outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inferior outcome 
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Appendix B: Choice-Closure Manipulation  
Studies 1a and 1b 
Image 1 (Trigger)  
 
 
 
Image 2 (No trigger)  
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Studies 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b  
Webpage A (Trigger)  
 
 
 
 
Webpage B (No trigger)  
 
 
42 
 
Study 4 
Webpage 1 (Trigger)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Webpage 2 (No trigger)  
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Appendix C: Pre-tests (Studies 1a and 4) 
Study 1a’s pre-test (N = 73) was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk and study 4’s 
pre-test (N = 75) on Prolific Academic. Participants chose one video clip or chocolate 
from the same selections used in the respective main studies and were then shown the 
two images or webpages employed in the main studies to manipulate choice closure.  
Sense of finality was measured by asking which image (study 1a) or webpage 
(study 4) was more likely to “make you perceive your choice as an ‘unfinished business’ 
(reverse-coded) / ‘closed book’?”; “help you feel that this choice is complete / 
reconsider your decision of what to choose (reverse-coded) / think of this choice as 
behind you / reach closure with your choice?” (study 1a’s pre-test: α = 0.83; study 4’s 
pre-test: α = 0.88). Comparison limitation was measured by asking which image (study 
1a) or webpage (study 4) was more likely to “make you keep comparing what you chose 
with what you did not choose / thinking about what you chose relative to what you did 
not choose?” (study 1a’s pre-test: α = 0.70; study 4’s pre-test: α = 0.84). All questions, 
which were adapted from previous research (Gu et al. 2013), were answered on bipolar 
scales (1 = definitely Image 1 / Webpage 1; 9 = definitely Image 2 / Webpage 2).  
One-sample t-tests on the aggregate scores using the scale’s midpoint as 
benchmark confirmed that Image 1 and Webpage 1, which featured the choice-closure 
trigger, were more effective in inducing a sense of finality (MImage1 = 3.78, SD = 2.03; 
t(72) = −5.14, p < .001; MWebpage1 = 3.52, SD = 1.82; t(74) = −7.04, p < .001) and in 
limiting comparisons (MImage1 = 5.71, SD = 2.62; t(72) = 2.30, p < .05; MWebpage1 = 6.04, 
SD = 2.26; t(74) = 3.98, p < .001) than Image 2 and Webpage 2, which did not feature 
this trigger. 
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FIGURE 1 
STUDY 1A: CHOICE CLOSURE AND SATISFACTION  
  
NOTE.—Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Inferior Superior
S
a
ti
s
fa
c
ti
o
n
 
50 
 
FIGURE 2 
STUDY 2A: CHOICE CLOSURE, FORCED COMPARISON, AND SATISFACTION  
Control Condition 
 
Forced-Comparison Condition 
 
NOTE.—Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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FIGURE 3 
STUDY 3A: CHOICE CLOSURE AND IMPROVING A SECOND CHOICE  
 
 
NOTE.—Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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FIGURE 4 
STUDY 3A: CHOICE CLOSURE AND ANTICIPATED SATISFACTION WITH A 
SECOND CHOICE  
 
 
 
NOTE.—Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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FIGURE 5 
STUDY 3B: CHOICE CLOSURE AND MAKING A GOOD-ENOUGH SECOND 
CHOICE 
 
NOTE.—Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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FIGURE 6 
STUDY 3B: CHOICE CLOSURE AND ANTICIPATED SATISFACTION WITH A 
SECOND CHOICE 
 
 
NOTE.—Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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FIGURE 7 
STUDY 4: EXPECTATION FOR THE EFFECT OF CHOICE CLOSURE ON 
SATISFACTION AND SALIENCE OF NO REPETITION    
 
 
 
NOTE.—Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. The scale is bipolar: 
higher values indicate higher expectation that the webpage without the choice-
closure trigger would lead to greater satisfaction; lower values indicate higher 
expectation that the webpage with the choice-closure trigger would lead to 
greater satisfaction.   
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